4. The fth charge is that she was free and so was illegally imported as a slave into Antigua and "there illegally held and detained in slavery" (180). So the question before the court upon which any decision rests is whether she was free.
5. But mere residence in England did not make her free. Manumission is required for freedom, and she was not manumitted while in England. a. The manners in which the slave was treated and this case is pleaded are both inconsistent with liberty. The slave did not of her own free will act to secure her liberty, but was seized by a customs of cial and handed over to an of cer of the Crown. And a free person is not to demand freedom by coming before a court pleading for freedom "at the discretion of the of cer of the Crown" (182).
b. The established record up until "Sommersett" was that "a slave coming from the West Indies,...to Great Britain doth not become free,…" (182).
c. "Sommersett" only established that "the owners of slaves had no authority...over them in England, nor any power of sending them back to the colonies" (183).
d. Any appeal to villenage is beside the point since it has ceased to exist in England for over 150 years in any form (183-84).
e. No record exists of any slave being free after having been brought to England and then having returned home (185).
f. A change in legal status is commonly produced by a "change of local situation" (185). Persons bound by contracts which constrain their liberty --e.g. apprentices --"lose their character and condition for the time when they reside in another country,...though they return to their original servitude and obligations upon coming back to the country they quitted" (184). g. The "maxim…'Once free for an hour, free for ever'...interest[s] none but the people of this country" (186). It lacks universal application.
h. Were it true that slaves could become free by setting foot in England, the "public inconvenience" could be great since they could return to the colonies free and constitute a group of individuals "not only extremely burdensome to the colony, but,...highly dangerous to its peace and security" (186). i) No legal precedents exist for residence in England making her free:
1. Shanley v. Harvey is not a precedent. "The error of the opinion seems to be, that, because the slave code was overruled in England, where the law of England differed from it, it was therefore abrogated in the colonies in toto" (187). It was changed in only two respects: what was given to the slave remained the slave's, and a slave may "have a habeas corpus if restrained of his liberty" (187).
2. Knight v. Wedderburn, a 1778 case in Scotland, is not a precedent either. All that it determines is that "different countries have different laws upon the same subject" and that "slaves coming into England are free there, and that they cannot be sent out of the country by any process to be there executed" (187).
3. Keane v. Boycott concerns a slave who made a contract with his master to serve him for ve years in England. Before the ve years was up, the slave was "enticed" into the military, the master sued the of cer who enticed his servant, and the master won. But this case has nothing to do with slavery. It turns on the law of contract.
Williams v.
Brown is directly to the point of this case. A runaway slave came to England, signed on as a sailor, but on the ship's coming into Granada, "the very island from which the man had deserted," his master discovered him and laid claim to him. The captain of the vessel and the master worked out an agreement that the slave would be manumitted, but would contract with the captain for three years. All the judges agreed that "he was a slave in Granada, though a freeman in England," and the proof is that upon his return to Granada he had to manumitted. Setting foot in England did not make him free in Granada (188).
Forbes v. Cochrane and Cockburn
is not relevant because all it showed was that slaves accepted onto a British ship of war were free while on the ship, the Captain having extended the "rights and immunities" of England to them, and that they could not be compelled through force to return to their master.
5. The act of Antigua of 1816 is not relevant since of the three conditions it states as providing for freedom --being "legally free," "in equity or conscience ought to be free," or has been "deemed...for any length of time a free person" --are not applicable (189).
